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COMMENTS
TAX IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT: DOES THE DAVIS
RULE STILL APPLY IN KENTUCKY?
INTRODUCTION

In the typical American household, the husband holds
paper title to most of the property.' This becomes significant
when a dissolution of the marriage occurs. During the divorce
proceedings, the husband's appreciated property may be transferred to the wife in satisfaction of her marital rights. The U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Davis2 held such a transfer
to be a taxable event in common-law states where the wife's
rights to her husband's property include only inchoate dower
and a reasonable share of marital property upon divorce.
This comment will examine the Davis decision to ascertain
apposite factors in determining whether a transfer of appreciated property from one spouse to the other pursuant to a
divorce is a nontaxable division between co-owners or a taxable
event. Also, the effect of Davis on the husband and wife in
common-law states vis-a-vis federal tax treatment of the couple in community property states will be examined.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals have interpreted Davis in
three different ways. A majority of the federal courts 3 have
adopted the "traditional" approach which requires that the
wife possess one of the common-law indicies of co-ownership
before a transfer incident to divorce will be exempt from taxation. The "equitable" approach of the Tenth Circuit' affords
I Nemy, FeministsLook at Alimony: It'sNot All Bad They Say, N.Y. Times, Feb.
6, 1976, at 37, col 1.
2 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
3 Wiles v. Comm'r, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974);
Comm'r v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1942); Comm'r
v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942); Kraut v. United
States, 316 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Wallace v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 748
(S.D. Iowa 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S..831 (1971); Dunn
v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. 664 (CCH 1977); McKinney v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. (263) (1975).
1 Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975); Collins v. Comm'r, 412 F.2d
211 (10th Cir. 1969).
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tax-free status to transfers in the common-law states of Oklahoma and Colorado. This approach predicates tax-free transfers at divorce upon a determination by the state's highest
court that the wife possesses a species of co-ownership. 5 This
type of co-ownership results from legislative recognition of the
wife's contribution to the acquisition of marital property.6 Finally, a "progressive" approach has been utilized by the Sixth
Circuit,7 which has held that the state statute on disposition
of marital property controls the federal tax outcome. Each of
these approaches will be compared to the statutes and case law
of Kentucky to determine whether transfers of appreciated
property between divorcing Kentuckians are entitled to taxfree status.
I. THE FEDERAL TAx CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE-RELATED
TRANSFERS OF APPRECIATED PROPERTY IN COMMON-LAw STATES
AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES

United States v. Davis' controls the taxability of transfers
of appreciated9 property by the husband I when title is held

solely in his name. In Davis, the taxpayer-husband, a Delaware
citizen, transferred appreciated stock to his wife in full settle' Imel v. United States, 517 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Colo. 1974). See also Collins v.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968), where the court held that the wife
had a vested interest in jointly-acquired property.
I COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West
Supp. 1976).
' Swaim v. Comm'r, 417 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969).
8 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
1 Should the husband transfer depreciated property to his wife, he may not be
entitled to a loss deduction. First, I.R.C. § 267 prohibits the deduction of any losses
in transactions between related parties, including husband and wife. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 694 (1947). This prohibition would not apply if the property
is transferred after the divorce is granted. See 95-3rd TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOUOS:
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION,

A-36 (1975). Second, I.R.C. § 165(c)(2), providing for the

deductibility of losses when they are "incurred in any transaction entered into for
profit," may or may not be activated in a divorce situation. The Commissioner has
taken the position that a sale pursuant to a divorce decree is not a sale entered into
for profit but is rather a sale motivated by personal reasons and does not qualify for
the section 165(c)(2) deduction. Robertson v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 862 (1971), acq. 1972-2
C.B. 3. The Tax Court disagreed with the Commissioner, thereby allowing a deductible
loss if the asset transferred would, absent divorce, give rise to a deductible loss on its
sale. Id.
,0 The Davis rule would, of course, apply when the wife conveys appreciated
property held in her name to the husband.
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ment of her marital rights to his property. The taxpayer had a
basis of more than $74,000 in the stock. At the time of transfer,
the stock had a fair market value of $82,250. The issue before
the Court was whether the husband should be taxed on the
increase in the value of the stock. 1
The taxpayer in Davis argued that the transfer, made in
satisfaction of the couple's property agreement, was not a sale
or exchange but a nontaxable division of property between coowners. The Court examined Delaware law to determine
whether the wife's marital rights could be equated with an
ownership interest in her husband's property. The existence of
such an ownership interest was determined by: (1) whether the
wife had a right to manage or dispose of her husband's property
during marriage; (2) whether the wife had a descendible share
in her husband's property, that is, an interest that could pass
by will or intestacy, rather than requiring that she survive her
husband to share in his intestate estate; and (3) whether the
wife had a right to a share of marital property other than what
a divorce court determined was a reasonable share upon dissolution of the marriage.'"
Under Delaware law the wife had none of the above rights.
Consequently, the husband had a personal obligation to the
wife which could be satisfied by the transfer of his property to
her; the wife had no bona fide ownership interest in the husband's property.' 3 A taxable event occurred when the husband
exchanged stock for the release of the wife's inchoate marital
rights, and, therefore, the husband was taxed on the gain. The
value of the legal obligation released by the wife was presumed
by the Court to be equal to the fair market value of the property
transferred.' 4 Thus, while the husband was taxed on his
"gain,"'" the wife received the stock tax free and took its fair
market value as her basis.'"
"

370 U.S. at 66-67.

,2Id. at 70.
13 Id.
" Id. at 71-72.
. . over the
' I.R.C. § 1001(a) defines "gain" as "the excess of amount realized.
adjusted basis." "Amount realized" is defined as the "fair market value of the property
(other than money) received." Id. at § 1001(b).
16370 U.S. at 73. Davis applies to the transfer of separately-owned appreciated
property pursuant to a divorce decree as well as to a property settlement. Wallace v.
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On the surface, Davis appears to benefit wives. However,
a closer examination of its effects reveals that wives are actually penalized. First, a husband naturally will be reluctant
to transfer appreciated property to his wife unless the property
is held jointly, 17 preferring a cash settlement to avoid the tax
consequences of the Davis rule.18 At least one court has condoned the transfer of cash instead of property even when the
wife had been granted a 40% interest in the marital property."1
In this situation, the cash the wife receives is a fluid asset
which will depreciate with inflation if not invested soon after
the divorce, instead of property which will appreciate in value.
The Davis decision may also result in an increased tax
burden on the wife.2" Since alimony is deductible from the
husband's gross income21 and is taxable as ordinary income to
the wife, 2 the husband may attempt to shift the tax burden by
characterizing cash payments to the wife as maintenance and
support; even though in reality they are in satisfaction of the
United States, 439 F.2d 757, 761 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971);
Comm'r v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642, 643 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1942);
Pulliam v. Comm'r. 39 T.C. 883 (1963), aff'd, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 836 (1964). If, however, the husband and wife held joint title to the property, no
taxable event occurs. Beth W. Corp. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (S.D.
Fla. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 481 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916
(1974); Hornback v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 977, 981 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Cofield v.
Koehler, 207 F. Supp. 73, 74 (D. Kan. 1962), appeal dismissed, 311 F.2d 221 (10th Cir.
1962); Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26. Contra, Swaim v. Comm'r, 417 F.2d 353, 35658 (6th Cir. 1969).
,7 See note 16 supra regarding the nontaxability of jointly-held property.
,S See Clark v. Clark, 487 S.W.2d 272 (Ky. 1972), where the husband structured
a property settlement to avoid paying capital gains tax on the transfer of real property
pursuant to a divorce. In lieu of her court-ordered 40% share of the property, the wife
received cash installment payments over an eight-year period.
,1 Id. at 275. In Clark, the wife argued that the property should have been divided
in-kind or sold and the proceeds apportioned. Since the property contested was a
business estate, the Court held that its "division or forced liquidation . . . could
materially depreciate its value and could destroy the basis of the husband's earning
capacity. In [such] circumstances it is proper to allow the wife the value of her share
in cash, payable in installments." Id.
0 See, e.g., West v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D. Tex. 1971), affl'd, 477
F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1973), where the wife received 121 monthly installments as a divorce
settlement. The wife contended that the payments represented her portion of the
jointly-acquired property and thus were not taxable. The payments were held to be
alimony and therefore taxable as ordinary income to the wife and deductible by the
husband.
2, I.R.C. §§ 101(e)(1), 215.
I.R.C. § 71.
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wife's claim to marital property.2 3 On such a transfer, which
settles the wife's property rights, the husband is not entitled
to a deduction and the wife is not subject to a tax.24 However,
in a dispute with the Commissioner, the taxpayer bears the
burden of proving the transfer was a property settlement and
not maintenance and support, or vice versa.2 In determining
the true nature of the payments, the courts make their own
examination based on several relevant factors;2 6 labels attached by the divorce court or the parties are not necessarily
controlling. 2 Thus, if the husband holds legal title to the bulk
of the property and claims an alimony deduction,2" the wife
bears the burden of proving that the cash settlement was for
29
the relinquishment of her property rights.
By contrast, the wife in a community property state" is a
co-owner of the marital property. 31 Consequently, under the
2 See note 20 supra for the summary of a case where this situation occurred. See
also Mills v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 608 (1970), affl'd, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971); Joslin
v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 231 (1969), affl'd, 424 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1970).
24 Mills v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 608 (1970), affl'd, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971); Treas.
Reg. § 1.71-(c)(4) (1957).
21 West v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 477 F.2d
563 (5th Cir. 1973).
21 Id. at 1106-07. See also Harris, The FederalIncome Tax Treatment of Alimony
Payments - The "Support" Requirement of the Regulations, 22 HASTINGs L. REv. 53,
78-79 (1970); Comment, Federal Tax Aspects of Divorce and Separation,44 Miss. L.J.
740, 747-48 (1973).
21 Mills v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 608 (1970), affl'd, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971).
21To qualify as alimony, the payments must be either periodic or in installments
over more than a 10-year period. I.R.C. § 71. If the payments do not meet the above
criteria, then they will not be included in the wife's gross income.
21 See, e.g., West v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D. Tex. 1971), affl'd, 477
F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1973).
N The eight traditional community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. 4A R. POWELL & P. Ronm,

POWELL ON REAL PaOPERTY

624.2 (rev. arb. ed. 1975).

Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). In Poe, the taxpayer-husband, a Washington citizen, was the sole wage earner who held all the community property in his name.
Nonetheless, the husband and wife each reported one-half of the total community
income on separate federal income tax returns. The Court examined the wife's rights
in the community property under state law by considering factors similar to those in
Davis. See text accompanying note 12 supra for an enumeration of the Davis factors.
The Court determined that the husband had complete control over the management
and disposition of the community property. In addition, both the state court and the
Supreme Court held that the wife had a vested interest in the community property.
The husband and wife were thus entitled to separate returns, each including one-half
of the community income. 282 U.S. at 108-11, 118.
"
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Davis rule, no taxable event occurs when appreciated property
is equally divided between the spouses pursuant to a property
settlement agreement or court decree. 32 The husband in a community property state is, therefore, not encouraged by federal
tax law to settle with his wife in cash rather than in property.
The obvious disparity in the tax treatment of divorce-related
transfers in common-law states and community property states
was recognized by the Court in Davis.33 Nevertheless, the Court
brushed aside this unequal treatment of husbands and wives
in common-law4 states as a "fact of life" that only Congress
3
could remedy.
II.

A.

INTERPRETATION OF

Davis:

THREE APPROACHES

The TraditionalApproach

The traditional approach has been advocated by the majority of federal courts3 5 and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.3 This approach reasons that Davis established federal
criteria which "must be met before the rights conferred by state
law can be said to constitute ownership." 37 The wife is deemed
a co-owner 38 if she has a right under state law to manage or
dispose of her husband's property, the right to a descendible
share of the property, or 39 the right to a share of her husband's
property beyond merely a reasonable share upon divorce."0 The
is subject
divorce-related conveyance of the husband's property 41
to taxation if the wife possesses none of these rights.
31Note, The FederalIncome Tax Consequences of Property Settlements in Common Law States and Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: A Proposal,29
ME. L. REv. 73, 81 (1977). See also Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26, which states that
co-ownership of property exists for federal tax purposes when "(1) title ... istaken
jointly under State property law, (2) the State is a community property law State, or
(3) State property law is found to be similar to community property law."
- 370 U.S. at 71.
34 Id.

See note 3 supra for a citation of cases that follow the traditional approach.
36Collins v. Comm'r, 412 F.2d 211, 212 (10th Cir. 1969).
37Id. at 212.
The wife would also be a co-owner if she held title to the property jointly with
her husband. See note 16 supra for cases supporting this principle.
-" All three factors are not required for the wife to be deemed a co-owner. See Note,
supra note 32, at 82-87.
0 370 U.S. at 70.
4' Id.; Wiles v. Comm'r, 499 F.2d 255, 257-58 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
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Examination of Kentucky law reveals the absence of the
first two indicia of ownership. First, neither the husband 2 nor
the wife 3 has a right to manage or dispose of the other's
separately-owned property. 4 Second, dower rights in Kentucky
do not include a right to a descendible share, that is, the wife's
rights in her husband's property cannot pass by will or intestacy.45 In fact, once a divorce is granted, all claims to dower are
barred. 46 Nonetheless, there are two Kentucky cases which
characterize dower as a property right that "vests" during marriage.4 1 In community property states the wife is considered a
co-owner because she has a vested interest in the community
property during coverture. 48 Arguably the Kentucky wife is also
a "co-owner" by virtue of the vested dower interest in her husband's property during marriage.49 However, Chalk v. Chalk
indicates the untenable nature of this argument by noting that
dower attaches when the spouse acquires property and vests
only upon the spouse's death.5 1 Chalk is consistent with the
recognized interpretation of dower" and with Kentucky law
which requires the spouse to survive her partner to share in his
intestate estate.52 Since dower vests only upon death, it is not
a descendible interest but an "inchoate right . . . [which
966 (1974); Wallace v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 748, 761 (S.D. Iowa 1970), affd,
439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971).
4 Ky. Rev. STAT. § 404.010(1) (1970) [hereinafter cited as KRS] provides that
the husband shall have no interest in the wife's real or personal property even though
it may be acquired during coverture.
"R. PgrmRLU, KENTUcKY FAMILY LAW § 14.2 (1969).
" In Kentucky, marriage does not create a presumption of an agency relationship
when one spouse deals with the other spouse's property. Agency authority must be
established as in any other case. Lazarus' Adm'x v. Hall, 152 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1941).
- KRS § 392.020 (1970). Specifically, the surviving spouse is entitled to an estate
in fee of one-half of the surplus realty of which the deceased spouse was seized in fee
simple at the time of death, a life estate in one-third of the real estate the deceased
spouse was seized in fee simple during coverture but not at the time of death (if the
survivor's interest has not been relinquished by release), and an absolute estate of onehalf of the surplus personalty. Id.
" KRS § 392.090(1) (1970).
, Truitt v. Truitt's Adm'r, 162 S.W.2d 31 (Ky. 1942); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lewis,
124 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1939).
u Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111 (1930).
" See Truitt v. Truitt's Adm'r, 162 S.W.2d 31, 35 (Ky. 1942); Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Lewis, 124 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Ky. 1939).
165 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Ky. 1942).
, Note, Inchoate Dower - An Idea Whose Time is Past, 60 Ky. L.J. 670, 680 (1972).
KRS § 392.020 (1970).
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does] not even remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership. 53
The third factor to consider is whether the wife in Kentucky has the right to receive more than a reasonable share of
her husband's property upon divorce. In Davis,54 the Delaware
wife shared in her husband's property only to the extent the
court deemed reasonable. 5 The wife's financial condition, her
health and age, her needs in relation to her social position, the
number and ages of the children, -and the husband's earning
capacity were factors the Delaware state courts reviewed in
dividing the property.5" Since the enactment of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, 57 Kentucky courts divide the marital property in just proportions considering all relevant factors,
including financial and in-kind contribution of each spouse to
the acquisition of marital property; value of nonmarital property; duration of the marriage; and the economic circumstances of each spouse when the property division is to become
effective. 5
The procedures in Kentucky for division of property are
dissimilar to those of Delaware because Kentucky recognizes
the wife's in-kind contribution to the acquisition of marital
property. For example, the value of a wife's services as a homemaker is considered to be a contribution to the acquisition of
marital property. Furthermore, all property acquired during
coverture is presumed to be marital property regardless of
title.59 Despite these differences, the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Wiles v. Commissioner" suggests that the Kentucky system of
property division does not result in co-ownership to the extent
necessary to satisfy the "traditional" interpretation of Davis.
Wiles involved the Kansas system for the division of property upon divorce, a system much like that currently used in
Kentucky. In Kansas, divorce courts are required to marshal
all of the jointly-acquired property, regardless of title, and div0

U.S. v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 70 (1962).

$4 Id.

DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1531 (1953) (current version at DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1513
(Cum. Supp. 1977)). Section 1513 is similar to KRS § 403.190 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
m 370 U.S. at 70.
57 KRS §§ 430.010, 403.110-.350 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
KRS § 403.190(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
5' KRS § 403.190(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
10 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
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ide it in a just and reasonable manner. 1 The contribution of
each party, the earning capacity of each party, the source of the
property, fault, need, ages, and length of marriage are taken
into consideration. 2 The Wiles court held "[t]hese factors
. . . inconsistent with the idea of co-owned property. If the wife
were a co-owner. . ., her interest in the property to be divided
would be based on more than a right to a 'just and equitable'
share therein."" Because the Kansas and Kentucky provisions
for the division of marital property are very similar,6 4 transfers
in Kentucky would not appear to qualify for tax-free status
under the traditional approach.
Since a just division of the property considering all the
relevant factors does not entitle the wife to "more than a reasonable share,""5 the wife must be entitled to an absolute percentage of the property upon divorce, to meet the third criterion of ownership. 6 Therefore, a system similar to the one in
California, where the wife is granted one-half of the community
property upon divorce, 7 would be the only type that would
appear to satisfy the above ownership test under the traditional
approach to Davis. But Kentucky law does not grant the wife
a uniform, definite percentage of the marital property, 6 even
though the recent Kentucky Court of Appeals case of Herron
v. Herron9 held that the wife's contribution to the accumulation of marital property should be presumed equal to the husband's in a marriage which has endured for a long period and
where accumulation of the marital property has been modest.
In this situation, the property should be equally divided between the spouses absent a rebuttal of the contribution presumption. 70 The traditional approach is based on "the presence
STAT. § 60-1610(c) (1976).
499 F.2d at 257-58. See text accompanying notes 104-09 infra for the factors
taken into consideration under Kentucky law.
" Id. at 258.
" Compare KAN. STAT. § 60-1610(c) (1976), regarding the disposition of jointlyacquired property, with KRS § 403.190 (Supp. 1976), which provides for the division
of marital property. The Kentucky statute provides that property shall be divided "in
just proportions." Id.
See 499 F.2d at 257-58.
" See Note, supra note 32, at 110.
' CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
KRS § 403.190 (Supp. 1976).
"[1977] 4 F s. L. REP (BNA) 2058 (Ky. App. Nov. 4, 1977).
7 Id.
" KA.
12
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or absence of significant meaningful attributes of ownership
arising under state law on the part of the wife." 7 It is doubtful
that the Herron rebuttable presumption of equal distribution
qualifies as a significant attribute of ownership. Although the
presumption may be analogized to a defeasible title, 72 it is
merely an evidentiary tool that shifts the burden of producing
evidence.13 In addition, until the Kentucky Supreme Court
clarifies the issue of "percentage distribution," the Herronpresumption will not be determinative in federal tax cases since
federal courts are not bound by decisions of intermediate state
appellate courts. 74 Thus, the Davis rule requiring the taxation
of transfers of appreciated property upon divorce would seem
to apply in Kentucky under the traditional approach.
B.
1.

The EquitableApproach
The Collins and Imel Cases

The equitable approach to the Davis decision deemphasizes the common-law indicia of ownership. Courts emphasizing the equitable approach, such as the Tenth Circuit in
Collins v. Commission,75 contend that a vested interest in marital property arises at the filing of a divorce action, thereby
making any transfer incident to divorce non-taxable. These
courts substitute this vested interest for the common-law ownership required by those courts employing the traditional approach discussed above.
In Collins an Oklahoma taxpayer transferred shares of
stock to his wife pursuant to a divorce agreement. The Commissioner maintained that this transfer was a sale or exchange
and levied a deficiency assessment. Because "Oklahoma by
statutory command has created unique rights in the [marital]
partners . . . [resembling] those found in . . . community
11Wallace v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 748, 761 (S.D. Iowa 1970), aff'd 439 F.2d
757 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971).
2 See 4 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAw OF REAL PROPERTY §
1870 (repl. ed. 1961).
73See generally MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 342 (E. Cleary
ed. 1972).
1,Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
75388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.), vacated and remandedper curiam, 393 U.S. 215 (1968),
on remand, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
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property states," Collins argued that the transfer was a nontaxable division of property between co-owners. The Oklahoma
divorce statute" was interpreted by the taxpayer as granting
each spouse a vested interest in jointly-acquired property.78 In
Collins I, the federal court used the traditional approach, declaring the transfer a taxable exchange.7 ' The Oklahoma statute" was not considered to be determinative of federal tax consequences.'
Although Collins lost in the Tenth Circuit, he pursued his
argument in the Oklahoma Supreme Court.82 Collins IP3 involved a state tax assessment on the stock transfer; the issues
were identical to CollinsL " The state's highest court disagreed
with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion and held that the Oklahoma statute8 confers upon the wife "a vested interest in
jointly acquired property of the marital community." 8
Subsequent to Collins 11, the Supreme Court, in Collins
III,"7 granted certiorari in Collins I, vacated the judgment and
remanded it to the Tenth Circuit. In Collins IV,8 the issue
framed by the Tenth Circuit was whether the transfer "more
nearly resembles a nontaxable division of property between coowners, or . . . a taxable transfer in exchange for the release
of an independent legal obligation."" The court rejected the
traditional approach, held that the vested interest found in
1,388

F.2d at 355.

7 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78). Compare OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78) with KAN. STAT. § 60-1610(c)

(1976). Although the Oklahoma and Kansas statutes are nearly identical, the Tenth
Circuit held in Wiles v. Comm'r, 499 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1964), that the Kansas
"wife has no vested co-ownership in property of the husband during the marriage." See
text accompanying notes 60-63 supra for a summary of the Wiles case.
11388 F.2d at 354. The extent of this vested interest is not established by statute
but is determined by the court in an action for divorce. Id.
, Id. at 357-58.
M OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
, 388 F.2d at 357-58.
AZ Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
'~Id.
"

See text accompanying notes 76-78 suprafor a discussion of the issues in Collins

,

OKLA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 12, § 1278 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).

u Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 297 (Okla. 1968).
0 393 U.S. 215 (1968).

F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
1, Id. at 212.
U 412
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Collins II was a sufficient interest for Davis purposes, and concluded that the transfer was a nontaxable division between co90
owners.
Imel v. United States9 involved a Colorado husband who
sued for a refund of taxes assessed on appreciated capital assets
transferred by him to his former wife in fulfillment of a property settlement agreement. The federal district court certified
to the Colorado Supreme Court the question of whether the
wife's rights in the marital estate constituted a "species of
common ownership." 9 2 The Colorado Supreme Court responded affirmatively, concluding that the wife has a vested
interest in her husband's property at the time the divorce action is filed. 3 Appealing the district court's subsequent judgment for the taxpayer, the government argued that a state
court cannot determine what constitutes a taxable event under
federal tax law." However, the Tenth Circuit held that ownership is a question for the state courts and that Davis does not
require vesting of the wife's interest prior to the initiation of the
divorce action. 5
2.

A Comparison of Kentucky Law with Colorado and
Oklahoma Law

The law regarding the disposition of marital property in
Kentucky, Colorado,"6 and Oklahoma is almost identical. All
three states grant spouses the right to petition the divorce court
for a just division of marital property. While the division of
property is mandatory,98 the court has discretion in determining the amount to which each party is entitled. 9 The definition
o Id.
375 F. Supp. 1102 (D.Colo. 1974), affl'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975).
,2375 F. Supp. at 1116.
9 Imel v. United States, 517 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo. 1974).
" 523 F.2d at 855.
" Id. at 855-56.
" CoLo. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973) and KRS § 403.190 (Cum. Supp. 1976)
relating to disposition of marital property are derived from the UNFOaM MARMGE AND
DIVORCE ACr § 307 (Alternative B) (1973 amended version).
'1 COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (Cur Supp. 1976); KRS § 403.190(1) (Cur.
Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1278 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
" Imel v. U.S., 375 F. Supp. 1102, 1110 (D. Colo. 1974), affl'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th
Cir. 1975); Petersen v. Petersen, 479 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Ky. 1972); Collins v. Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968).
" In re Marriage of Lodholm, 536 P.2d 842, 844 (Colo. 1975); Herron v. Herron,
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of marital property in Colorado '00 and Kentucky 10° is more specific than the Oklahoma'02 definition of jointly-acquired property. But this distinction is insignificant since the purpose of
all three definitions is to segregate property acquired outside
the marital relationship from property acquired by the joint
efforts of the parties during marriage.
Once the divorce action is filed with the court, property
acquired during coverture is deposited in a hypothetical
"hotchpot" and legal title is disregarded." 3 In effectuating a
division, the courts in these states consider the contribution of
each party - including homemaker services - to the acquisition of the property." 4 Marital misconduct is not a factor;"°5
however, the future economic position .of each spouse is relevant.' 6 Only Kentucky lists duration of marriage as a consideration," 7 but Colorado may also give this element some attention since the applicable Colorado statute directs the court to
consider all relevant factors." ' Disposition of the marital property by the courts is final in all three states and the matter
cannot be reopened or modified absent extraordinary circumstances."'
Comparison of the law of the three states reveals one crucial distinction for Davis purposes. The highest courts in Colorado'1° and Oklahoma"' have held that the wife has a vested
[1977] 4 F ,. L. REp. (BNA) 2058 (Ky. App. Nov. 4, 1977); Durfee v. Durfee, 465 P.2d
161, 165 (Okla. 1969).
IN CoLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113(2) (1973).
"I KRS § 403.190(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
,,, OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1278 (West Cum Supp. 1977-78).
10 CoLO. REV. STAT. 14-10-113(3) (1973); KRS § 403.190(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1278 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
' Durfee v. Durfee, 465 P.2d 161, 165 (Okla. 1969); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10113(1)(a) (1973); KRS § 403.190(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'0 Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 14-10-113(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); KRS § 403.190(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'" Durfee v. Durfee, 465 P.2d 161, 165 (Okla. 1969); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10113(1)(c) (1973); KRS § 403.190(1)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
10 KRS § 403.190(1)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
' CoLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(i) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
," McDonald v. McDonald, 374 P.2d 690, 691 (Colo. 1962); Feland v. High, 67
P.2d 967, 969 (Okla. 1937); KRS § 403.250(l) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
I' Imel v. United States, 517 P.2d 1331, 1332 (Colo. 1974).
"' Sanditen v. Sanditen, 496 P.2d 365, 367 (Okla. 1972). See also Lilly,
Oklahoma'sTroublesome CovertureProperty Concept, 11 TULSA L.J. 1, 16 n.90 (1975),
where the author argues that the Sanditen court should have held that filing of the
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right to the marital property once the divorce action is filed.
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court has concluded that the
wife has "vested 'ownership' interest""' in team effort property
regardless of title," 3 the Court has not yet held that this interest vests as of the filing of the divorce action. At first glance,
the Court's decision in Clark v. Clark"' seems to indicate that
the wife does not have a vested interest in the property when
the divorce action is filed, but does have such interest when the
final judgment is rendered. A close reading of the case reveals,
however, that Clark turned on the law of remedies, and did not
confront the issue of when the right to a share of marital property vests in a spouse.
The original judgment in Clark was reversed in part and
remanded by the Court for reconsideration"' in light of the
principles established in Colley v. Colley."' On remand, the
trial court granted the wife 40% of the value of the team effort
property, to be paid by the husband in installments. The decree directed the husband to pay interest on these payments
from the date of the judgment granting the divorce. 7 On apdivorce action restricts alienation and that vesting occurs only as a result of the court
decree.
"2 Cooke v. Cooke, 449 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Ky. 1969). Cooke predates Colley v.
Colley, 460 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1970), and the enactment of KRS § 403.190 (Cum. Supp.
1976). See note 113 infra for a summary of the Colley case.
In Cooke the trial court awarded the jointly-owned property to the wife even
though the husband furnished the initial capital investment. The law at that time
required restoration of property to the spouse who furnished the consideration, regardless of title. Affirming the trial court's decision, the Court liberally construed the
definition of consideration to include the wife's in-kind contribution. "We see no justifiable reason why the 'happenstance of which party had the cash to put up the original
down payment, . . . should be the immutable criterion of 'ownership.' " 449 S.W.2d
at 217. Where property has been accumulated by the joint efforts of the husband and
wife, both spouses have "a vested 'ownership" interest." Id. at 218.
"3 Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1970). Colley is a landmark opinion
which expands Cooke v. Cooke, 449 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1969), and requires the division
of property acquired during coverture to be based on the respective contribution of
each spouse. The Court concluded that the wife's separate earnings or the contribution
of her domestic services entitle her to an equitable or titular interest in the jointlyacquired property regardless of record title. 460 S.W.2d at 825. K.R.S. § 403.190 (Cum.
Supp. 1976) is a codification of the Colley decision. See Note, Kentucky's New Dissolution of MarriageLaw, 61 Ky. L.J. 980, 990 (1973).
"1 487 S.W.2d 272 (Ky. 1972).
"5 471 S.W.2d 740 (Ky. 1971).
1,5
460 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1970). See note 113 supra for a summary of the Colley
opinion.
"1 487 S.W.2d at 273.
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peal, the Court surmised that pre-judgment interest was
awarded on the trial court's theory that the wife's right in the
joint-effort property became vested once the divorce was
granted.11 8 The Court reversed, holding that since the wife had
"nothing more than an unliquidated claim""' against her husband, she was only entitled to interest on the final judgment.
The Court found dissolution of a marriage to be unlike dissolution of a partnership, for in the latter, the partners' share can
be ascertained by bookkeeping principles; in the former, the
wife's share can be determined only by the court's evaluation
of many intangible factors.12
Clark can conceivably be read two ways. One interpretation would be that the wife has no ownership interest in the
property until final judgment. This interpretation is consistent
with the traditional approach 121 and contrary to the equitable
approach, 122 under which the wife has a vested ownership right
at the moment the divorce action is filed. It seems clear, however, that Clark simply expressed adherence to the rule that
courts refuse to award pre-judgment interest on unliquidated,
unascertainable claims.' This reading explains the Court's
comparison of a marriage to a business partnership. 124 When a
partnership is dissolved, a partner's claim, although unliquidated, is ascertainable; consequently, pre-judgment interest is
awarded.1 2 By contrast, the wife's share is not immediately
ascertainable; therefore, pre-judgment interest is not appropriate. Thus Clark does not indicate the opinion of Kentucky's
highest court on when the right to a share of marital property
vests in a spouse. Absent a resolution of this issue by the Kentucky Supreme Court, federal courts may refuse to apply the
126
equitable approach used in Collins and Ime.
" This theory could currently have some impact on the Kentucky appellate court
decisions, since James Park, Jr., trial judge in Clark, id. at 272, presently sits on the
Kentucky Court of Appeals.
"I Id. at 274.
,2 Id.

"I'See text at Part H(A) supra.
' See text at Part 1(B)(1) supra.
'12D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.5 (1973). Accord, Lebow v. Cameron, 394 S.W.2d 773,
777 (Ky. 1965).
" See Curtis v. Campbell, 336 S.W.2d 355, 361-62 (Ky. 1960), the partnership
case referred to by the Court in Clark, 487 S.W.2d at 274.
"2 487 S.W.2d at 274.
,26See text at Part 1(B)(1) supra.
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The ProgressiveApproach

Prior to the enactment of Kentucky Revised Statutes §
403.190,' the divorce court was required to divest a wife of
property held in her name if it was obtained solely as a result
2
of her marriage, rather than by her financial contribution.
Ownership rights in this property were then restored to the
husband who had furnished the monetary consideration.'2 9 The
Sixth Circuit decided Swaim v. Commissioner'3 when this restoration system was still in effect.
In Swaim, the husband and wife purchased a home during
coverture and took title as joint tenants. Later they sold the
home, and both husband and wife received separate but identical promissory notes as payment.' 31 The wife's promissory notes
were restored to the husband in a divorce proceeding on a finding by the court that the husband had furnished the entire
purchase price of the home. When the husband subsequently
transferred one of these restored notes to the wife pursuant to
the divorce decree, the court was asked to determine whether
the husband realized a taxable gain. 3 - The Sixth Circuit decided that since the "restoration statute affects the substantive
property rights of the parties to a divorce proceeding,' ' 33 the
trial judge's determination of ownership - based upon whether
the property was obtained solely due to the marriage - con3
trols, and the transfer was declared to be a taxable event.' 1
The novelty of the Sixth Circuit approach is due to the fact
that it allows the divorce court's decision regarding ownership
to dictate the outcome in federal tax litigation. Unlike the
traditional and equitable approaches, Swaim does not require
35
either a consideration of the traditional criteria of ownership'
or a ruling by the state's highest court that the provider of the
monetary consideration has a vested interest in that property
regardless of legal title once the divorce action is filed. Swaim,
'

(Supp. 1976) [hereinafter referred to as KRS].

'M KRS §§ 403.060, 403.065 (1970) (repealed 1972).
'2 Smith v. Smith, 436 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1969).

1' 417 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969).
,3,
Id. at 354.
3I Id. at 354-56.
,33
Id. at 357.
'l Id. at 357-58.
13 See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
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therefore, not only extends and redefines the concepts behind
the equitable approach, but also demonstrates that ownership
prior to a divorce proceeding is not necessarily dispositive of
whether a transfer constitutes a taxable event, and that a state
statute can confer ownership rights upon divorce irrespective
of paper title. 3 '
The analysis utilized in Swaim can be applied to KRS §
403.190, the current statute which determines disposition of
marital property in Kentucky. Section 403.190 affects substantive property rights' 7 for purposes of applying Swaim, to the
same extent as the restoration statutes did previously." 8 Both
the former and present statutes ignore paper title in a determination of ownership.'39 While the restoration statutes based
ownership on financial contribution,' KRS § 403.190 predicates ownership on in-kind contribution as well as valuable
consideration. Thus, just as the court in Swaim disregarded the
wife's title and conferred ownership on the husband because he
furnished the monetary consideration,' the court could now
ignore the husband's title and declare the wife the owner based
on her in-kind contribution.
For example, assume that the husband is the fee simple
owner of a residence and a farm. Assume further that in a
divorce proceeding, the court divides the marital property pursuant to KRS § 403.190 and grants the wife the residence in fee
simple. Using the Swaim approach,12 the court's determination of ownership - based on the factors listed in the statute
- controls, and the husband incurs no tax liability when the
residence is transferred. The outcome is identical to that of the
equitable approach.' Courts advocating the traditional approach may challenge the Swaim court's disregard of paper
title in defining a taxable event. Nonetheless, just as the law
confers ownership rights on the adverse possessor' and the
,u 417 F.2d at 357-58.
" See, e.g., Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Ky. App. 1977).
See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
"'

KRS § 403.065 (1970) (repealed 1972); KRS § 403.190(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976).

'" Eckhoff v. Eckhoff, 247 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Ky. 1951).

m 417 F.2d at 357-58.
,42See text accompanying notes 130-33 supra.
" See text at Part ll(B)(1) supra.
24 See, e.g., Ely v. Fuson, 180 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. 1944); KRS § 413.010 (1970).
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grantee of a deed,' it can also confer ownership on the wife
who contributes in-kind services to the acquisition of marital
property.
The Swaim approach may also be criticized as a mechanical application of a state trial court's adjudication of ownership
to a federal tax question."4 Such criticism should not preclude
utilizationi of this approach. The Supreme Court held in
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch'47 that federal authorities are
not bound by a state trial court's ruling on state law when a
case involves a federal question. The Court, however, did not
forbid the federal courts from utilizing determinations of state
law made by lower-level state courts.'48 In considering the taxability of a divorce-related transfer of appreciated property, federal courts should determine the wife's ownership rights in the
marital property by applying substantive state law'49 and giving proper regard to the trial court's conclusions."'
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In common-law states, the application of the principles
announced in United States v. Davis"' determines whether a
divorce-related transfer of appreciated property by the husband to the wife will be a taxable event. The husband realizes
income in the amount of the appreciation if the wife's marital
rights in his property include only inchoate dower and the right
to a reasonable share of his property upon divorce. The Supreme Court has described these rights as being closer to a
burden on the husband's property that a bona fide property
interest. In this situation, the Davis court held that the transfer
was a taxable transfer of appreciated property in exchange for
the release or satisfaction of a personal obligation, rather than
a tax-free transfer in satisfaction of a pre-existing property
interest.
'
146
14

KRS §§ 381.060(2), 381.170 (1970).
See Legget v. Comm'r, 329 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1964).

387 U.S. 456 (1967).

' Id. at 465.
649 This is essentially what the Sixth Circuit did in Swaim v. Comm'r, 417 F.2d
353 (6th Cir. 1969), where it examined state law, as established by the statutes and
Kentucky's highest court, in reaching a determination on the issue of taxation while
affording proper regard to the trial court's conclusions.
1" 387 U.S. at 465.
,s, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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There are three varying interpretations of the Davis case
in the federal courts: the traditional approach, the equitable
approach, and the progressive approach. The traditional approach, used by the majority of federal courts, establishes the
power to manage or dispose, the right to a descendible interest,
and the right to some percentage of property (other than a
reasonable share upon divorce) as the rights a wife must have
in her husband's property to be deemed a co-owner for income
tax purposes. In Kentucky the wife does not have the right to
manage or dispose of her husband's proprty, nor does she have
a descendible interest. The Kentucky statutory scheme (where
all jointly-acquired property is commingled upon divorce and
a just division is made based on the contribution of the parties,
duration of the marriage, economic circumstances of the parties, and other relevant factors) does not give the wife anything
other than a reasonable share upon divorce. Consideration of
the factors of the Kentucky scheme is inconsistent with ownership under the traditional approach. Consequently, the Davis
rule of taxation applies to Kentucky if courts use the traditional approach. One of the effects of this view of Davis is that
the husband may prefer a cash settlement to a taxable transfer
of appreciated property. The wife is then left with a fluid asset
subject to inflation and the-possibility of installment obligations which subsequently may have to be enforced in court.
The equitable approach has been followed by the Tenth
Circuit and applied to divorce in the common-law states of
Colorado and Oklahoma. The supreme courts of these states
have concluded that the wife has a vested property interest in
the marital property once the divorce action is filed. As a result, the Tenth Circuit has determined that the transfer of
appreciated property by the husband upon divorce is more like
a division of property between co-owners than a transfer in
relinquishment of a personal obligation. Consequently, the
transfer is treated like those in community property states and
no income is realized by the husband for federal tax purposes.
Kentucky's disposition of marital property statute is almost identical to the statutes of Colorado and Oklahoma. The
Kentucky Supreme Court, however, has not yet determined
that the wife has a vested interest in the marital property once
the divorce action is filed. Until such a decision is rendered, it
is unlikely that the equitable approach will be applied by the
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federal courts to eliminate the tax consequences of Davis on
divorce-related transfers of appreciated property in Kentucky.
The progressive approach was applied by the Sixth Circuit
when Kentucky's restoration statutes, now repealed, were in
effect. Upon divorce, the restoration statutes divested the
spouse of title to property if he or she had not financially contributed to its purchase. In Swaim v. Commissioner,'52 the

Sixth Circuit recognized that the restoration statutes substantially affected the property rights of the husband and wife.
Applying the state trial court's interpretation of state law, the
court of appeals concluded that even though the wife held legal
title to the property, the husband was the rightful owner since
he had furnished the consideration therefor. The husband was
taxed when the wife ultimately received the property pursuant
to a divorce decree.
This approach, when applied to Kentucky's current divorce law, results in d tax-free transfer. The applicable statute,
KRS § 403.190, requires the courts to ignore legal title and
divide the jointly-acquired property on the basis of each party's
financial or in-kind contribution, the duration of the marriage,
economic circumstances of the spouses and other relevant factors. The Kentucky Supreme Court has made it clear that KRS
§ 403.190, like the former restoration statutes, affects substantial property rights of the parties. If the wife is adjudged the
owner of a certain portion of the marital property based on her
contribution to its acquisition, then the Sixth Circuit approach
will disregard the transfer of bare legal title by the husband.
This method is superior to the traditional view since it recognizes that ownership rights can be created by statute as well
as by common law. Other states having statutes similar to
Kentucky would also benefit if this progressive approach were
utilized.' 53 The husband would not be burdened with increased
tax liability and the wife would be in a better position to negotiate for valuable property.
Unlike courts using the traditional approach, the Sixth
Circuit does not demand that state law grant the wife an absolute percentage of the marital property upon divorce in order
152417

F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969).

"I See ME. REv. STAT. tit. 19,

452.330 (Vernon) (1977).

§ 722-A (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN.

STAT. §
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for her to be deemed a co-owner. The progressive approach
affords a state some flexibility by permitting the division of
team effort property based on each party's contribution to the
marriage. Because each marriage is unique, this is probably the
fairest method of dividing marital property. The progressive
approach is also preferable to the equitable approach because
it refuses to rely on fictitious labels of ownership supplied by
state supreme courts. On the other hand, mechanistic application of a state trial court's adjudication of ownership to a federal tax question could be dangerous. However, this criticism
would be unfounded if state law were carefully examined before
a decision was rendered. The progressive approach will function well, provided a federal court assumes the same posture
as the state's highest court when it determines the property
rights of the wife who has received appreciated property pursuant to a divorce. The Sixth Circuit approach is legally sound,
achieves a just result, and should be applied to divorce-related
transfers of appreciated property in Kentucky to eliminate the
harsh tax consequences of the Davis rule."'
Susan L. Coleman
'5 A party to a divorce proceeding in Kentucky may wish to contest the applicability of Davis using the equitable or progressive approach. If so, the party's lawyer
should itemize the non-marital and marital property in the property settlement agreement and expressly designate the marital property which constitutes the separate
ownership interest of each spouse. If appreciated property (such as shares of corporate
stock) held by the husband is to be transferred to the wife to effectuate the terms of
the property settlement agreement, it may be advantageous to both parties to execute
an escrow agreement simultaneously with the property agreement. The escrow agreement would enable the parties to divide the tax liability on the transfer if Davis were
held applicable and would provide a method whereby payment of such contingent tax
liability would be secured. Specifically, the escrow agreement should provide that the
wife agrees to pay one-half (or some other portion) of the tax in the event the Internal
Revenue Service successfully challenges the husband's argument that the transfer was
not a taxable event but rather a division of property among co-owners. To secure the
wife's payment of this contingent tax liability, the escrow agreement should provide
that the wife shall deliver a portion of the appreciated property (e.g., 25% of the
corporate stock transferred by the husband) to a named escrow agent upon execution
of the agreements. If the tax liability becomes due and the wife does not pay the
husband her portion of the amount owed, then the escrow agent should be empowered
to sell such of the shares of stock in escrow as are necessary to pay the wife's portion
of the taxes due. If, on the other hand, the wife pays her portion of the tax liability or
it is determined that the transfer constituted a non-taxable event or upon the expiration of the period of limitations, the escrow agreement should provide that the escrow
agent shall transfer such stock to the wife. During the period that the stock is in escrow,
the wife should be entitled to all the privileges of ownership of the stock, including
voting rights and the right to all dividends.

